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Abstract 
Tipping illustrates the importance of social norms in motivating economic behavior. 
People tip because this is the social norm and disobeying norms results in social 
disapproval that creates emotional disutility. Tipping is also economically important: in 
the United States alone, millions of workers derive most of their income from tips, and 
annual tips amount to dozens of billions of dollars. I claim that tipping is not a single 
phenomenon; the economics of some tipping occasions is very different from that of 
others. I divide tipping to six different categories: reward-tipping, price-tipping, tipping-
in advance, bribery-tipping, holiday-tipping and gift-tipping, and discuss the economics 
of each category. The analysis suggests that in many cases the social norm of tipping has 
economic justification, because it solves some inefficiency and increases welfare. In 
particular, tipping can promote good service where other mechanisms fail to do so. This 
suggests that the relationship between economics and social norms is indeed complex; 
not only social norms motivate economic behavior, but also economic reasons may 
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Tipping: The Economics of a Social Norm 
I. Introduction 
Tipping is a phenomenon that illustrates the importance of social norms as 
motivating economic behavior. People tip because this is the social norm, and disobeying 
the norm creates emotional disutility because of social disapproval and related feelings 
such as embarrassment, guilt and unfairness. They voluntarily give money without 
receiving any future benefit from it, clearly in contradiction with the common assumption 
of a selfish economic agent.
1 
While a single tip usually does not exceed a few dozens of dollars, the prevalence of 
tipping makes the magnitude of tips in the aggregate a significant economic phenomenon. 
Hundreds of millions of consumers around the globe tip on a regular basis. The total 
amount of annual tips in US restaurants alone is estimated at about $26 billion.
2 Clearly, 
adding tips in other occasions and countries results in a much higher number.  
Moreover, millions of workers in the United States alone derive a significant portion 
of their income, often most of it, from tips. For example, servers in full course restaurants 
earn 58% of their income from tips (in fact, the true percentages are likely to be much 
higher, because tips are often unreported). In the United States, for over two million 
workers the primary occupation is being servers; the estimate for the number of servers 
including those who are servers as a secondary occupation is over three million (Wessels 
1997). Tipping is also a major source of income for taxi drivers and for many others.  
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Lynn, Zinkhan and Harris (1993), for example, considered 33 service professions that are 
tipped. 
Tipping is a unique form of an economic transaction. While a service is provided and 
is paid for as in numerous other transactions, the payment is voluntary and its magnitude 
is determined by social norms and by the consumer’s discretion rather than by a contract. 
How can we think about this transaction from an economic perspective? This is the main 
question this paper addresses. I claim, however, that tipping is not a single phenomenon. 
The economics of some tipping occasions is very different from that of some others. In 
the next sections I categorize tipping in six different categories: reward-tipping, price-
tipping, tipping-in advance, bribery-tipping, holiday-tipping and gift-tipping, and discuss 
the economics of each of these categories.  
II. Tipping as a Unique Economic Transaction 
Most economic transactions involve the exchange of goods, services, and money, 
between two or more parties. It is usually clear to all parties what they are entitled to 
receive in the transaction, and what they are obligated to give. Tipping, while still being 
an exchange of services for money, is less clear about the obligations of the parties. There 
is no explicit contract between the consumer, the worker, and the employer about the tip 
to be given.  
Tipping has several different forms, each having a different economic 
characterization. The common feature of all forms of tipping is the voluntary and 
discretionary nature of the tip: the consumer is free to choose how much to tip, if at all.  
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This definition excludes service charges that are sometimes added to the bill (for example 
in many European countries), imposed gratuities (US restaurants often impose a 15-18 
percent gratuity for large parties – usually six diners or more), and imposed tips (for 
example some tour packages include a certain amount that the consumer has to pay for 
tips). Indeed, these cases have little in common with voluntary tipping. I categorize the 
different forms of voluntary tipping to six main groups: 
1. Tips that are given after the service is rendered to induce good service, for 
example tipping waiters; I call it “reward-tipping.”  
2. Tips that are given after the service is rendered as the price of the service, for 
example tipping skycaps. I refer to it as “price-tipping.” 
3. Tips that are given before the service is rendered to induce good service, for 
example tipping the hotel concierge in advance, which I denote as “tipping-in-advance.” 
4. Tips that are given before the service is rendered as bribery, for example when 
tipping a maitre d’ to get a table when customers with reservations are waiting in line. 
This form of tipping is referred to as “bribery-tipping.”  
5. Holiday-tipping: these are tips that are given once a year to workers who serve the 
consumer during the year, such as the newspaper boy or the building doorman.  
6. Gift-tipping: tips that are non-monetary, for example giving chocolates to nurses 
who took good care of a patient. 





This is the most common form of tipping and the most significant in terms of the 
monetary amounts involved. In this form of tipping, the worker provides the service and 
then the consumer determines how much to tip him. Tipping of waiters, taxi drivers and 
barbers, in addition to many others, belongs to this group. The economic justification for 
reward-tipping is that it improves service quality. It can do so as long as the tips are 
positively correlated with service quality. Sources about tipping etiquette support such 
positive correlation, suggesting that tips should be reduced or not given at all when 
service quality is low (Post 1997; Schein, Jablonski and Wohlfahrt 1984). Moreover, 
empirical studies of tipping found that tips are indeed positively correlated with service 
quality, although the difference between tips given for good and mediocre service is 
small (Bodvarsson and Gibson 1997; Lynn and McCall 2000). In addition, when people 
are asked hypothetically how much they would tip for different quality levels, they report 
tipping significantly more for good service compared to bad service (Bodvarsson and 
Gibson 1999).
3 
Sisk and Gallick (1985) claim that tipping (reward-tipping according to the 
categories mentioned above) is an arrangement that protects buyers from an unscrupulous 
seller. Their interpretation and justification for tipping (with some complementary ideas 
of my own) is as follows. Often, what ensures the buyer that the good purchased would 
be satisfactory is the ability to return it to the seller if it is of inferior quality. It is usually 
impossible to return services, however. For services, one mechanism that ensures quality 
is the reputation of the firm. The firm does not provide low service quality because  
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consumers will avoid purchasing again and may also inform other potential buyers about 
the low quality. If the worker who provides the service does not have enough incentives 
not to harm the firm’s reputation, however, the worker is not likely to exert enough effort 
to provide good service. The firm can sometimes monitor the worker to ascertain that 
service quality is good; this may be too costly, however, meaning that the cost of 
monitoring exceeds the benefits from increased quality. In particular, if the firm deals 
mainly with non-repeated customers who do not communicate with future potential 
buyers (a restaurant that caters to tourists, for example), the benefits from increased 
service quality are reduced.  
Whenever the firm does not monitor the worker and the worker does not have 
incentives to provide good service, the buyer may be hurt by expecting and paying for 
good service and receiving bad service. When the cost of the service is high, the buyer 
may find it optimal to use litigation in order to be compensated. When service quality is 
unobservable to a third party, or when service cost is low, the buyer usually finds it 
optimal to pay despite the unsatisfactory service. This gives unscrupulous sellers the 
ability to maximize profits by providing low service quality at low cost rather than good 
service quality. Of course, in equilibrium the buyer may expect bad service quality and 
the market for good service quality may collapse, as in Akerlof’s (1970) seminal article 
about the market for lemons.  
To overcome this potential problem, tipping makes part of the equilibrium price 
discretionary and contingent on service quality. The consumer no longer has to prove that 
service quality was bad; he can reduce his tip according to service quality without having  
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to go to litigation. The worker has an incentive to provide good service because otherwise 
he may earn lower tips. In a way, tipping may protect both the buyer and the seller from 
costly negotiation. For example, if service in a restaurant was bad, the buyer may not 
want to pay the full price of the meal, yet there is no natural agreement with the owner 
what the discount for the bad service should be. Tipping provides a focal point for the 
negotiation: in most cases, the consumer pays the menu price but does not tip, or at least 
reduces the tip. While the buyer can in principle abuse his position as the last mover and 
not tip even when service is satisfactory, such behavior is rare. 
Conlin, Lynn, and O'Donoghue (2002) analyze the case of restaurant tipping (their 
analysis is applicable also to other forms of reward-tipping, however) and suggest that if 
efficiency requires the server to exert some effort, the server must have an incentive to 
exert this effort. While a service contract can provide this incentive, writing such contract 
between the customer and the server involves prohibitive transaction costs. Therefore, 
tipping serves as a substitute that economizes these transaction costs.  
I agree with their view, and think that in fact tipping can also save enforcement costs, 
the magnitude of which might be even more important than eliminating the cost of 
writing the contract. It is true that writing a contract between any possible combination of 
consumers and workers is prohibitively costly. One can imagine, however, that the firm 
could write a standard contract that applies to each of its workers and consumers; such 
contract has reasonable costs. The bigger problem, in my opinion, will be the 
enforcement of such contract: who will monitor the service quality? Will the consumer 
have to prove that service quality was not satisfactory, or the worker to prove that service  
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quality was good? How can one prove what the service quality was when service is 
personal and depends to a large extent on the friendliness of the worker? I claim that 
society, by creating the social norm of tipping and making people who stiff (who do not 
tip appropriately) feel embarrassed and unfair, provides an efficient enforcement 
mechanism. People then tip without the need for third party involvement in the evaluation 
of service quality, because their emotional disutility if they stiff after receiving good 
service exceeds the monetary gains.  
While the interpretation of tipping of Sisk and Gallick (1985) and of Conlin, Lynn, 
and O'Donoghue (2002) is somewhat different, both views support the conclusion that 
what I denoted reward-tipping is an economic mechanism that addresses certain market 
inefficiencies using consumer monitoring of the service.  
IV. Price-Tipping 
In this sort of tipping the tip is also given after the service is provided, as in reward-
tipping. In some cases the borderline between the two categories is not clear, but the idea 
behind price tipping is that tips are in fact the price of the service, not an incentive to 
provide better service. Tipping hotel bellman or airline skycap for carrying the luggage, 
or a doorman for stopping a taxi, belong to this group. Taking the example of the 
bellman, often the customary amount is specified as a certain price per bag. The service is 
quite homogeneous, and therefore it is not likely that the reason for tipping is to ensure 
service quality. After all, the bellman just brings bags from point A to point B. The tip is  
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given to the bellman as the price of his services, not to induce him to provide higher 
quality of service.  
Why then not have an explicit price? From efficiency point of view, tips can cut 
transaction costs. Tipping saves, for example, the need to issue a receipt. More 
importantly, however, the parties involved have several reasons to prefer tipping to 
explicit prices. Workers often underreport tip income to tax authorities, giving them a 
clear incentive to prefer tipping. The tax savings may in principle also benefit the 
employer and the consumer, through lower wages and prices. Moreover, the worker 
prefers tips because his total income is likely to be higher than if he would only receive a 
wage, even when his wage is reduced when he is tipped. The reason is that since wages 
are often bounded from below (either by zero or by a positive minimum wage), tips may 
bring the worker’s total income above his reservation wage, while without tips the 
employer just pays the worker’s reservation wage. In other words, the lower bound on 
wages introduces a market friction that is likely to lead to economic rents for the worker 
when tips are prevalent.   
The consumer often prefers tipping because it enables him to show his gratitude to 
the worker. In addition, because of preference for income equality, the consumer prefers 
tips to prices also because tips are likely to increase the worker’s income while a price is 
going to the business (whose owner is probably wealthier than the worker). The owner 
has an incentive to charge prices rather than to allow tips, in order to eliminate the 
economic rents that the worker may enjoy. However, owners have to take into account 
what is appropriate in their industry, and clearly when they accommodate the desires of  
 
9
the consumer and the worker they derive from it benefits as well. A hotel owner is not 
likely to charge the customer when the doorman stops a taxi for him, simply because it 
will be considered inappropriate; doorman services are free (do not involve an explicit 
price) anywhere in the industry. 
V. Tipping-in-Advance 
Tipping in advance was the original type of tipping in commercial enterprises. There 
are several versions for the origin of tipping, but one of the common versions dates 
tipping back to England of the sixteen century. Brass urns with the inscription “To Insure 
Promptitude” were placed first in coffee houses and later in local pubs, and people tipped 
in advance by putting money in these urns. 
The purpose of tipping-in-advance from the consumer’s perspective is to commit the 
worker to provide good service quality. This form of tipping reverses the opportunism 
problem: instead of the consumer being able to stiff, here the worker is able to provide 
bad service despite the advance tip. Tipping experts, however, suggest that workers who 
get advance tips try very hard to justify the trust they received: Brenner (2001) claims, 
“The advance tip is the most effective method for assuring results… This strategy will 
insure that you’ll be taken care of with the highest degree of consideration,” and Star 
(1988) suggests about hotel concierge “If you want to be fawned over, tip the concierge 
upon arrival as you introduce yourself.” Just as the consumer finds it less costly to tip 
than to feel unfair and embarrassed in reward-tipping, the worker prefers to exert effort 




The idea of bribery-tipping occurred to me while reading the description of tipping a 
maitre d’ in Schein, Jablonski and Wohlfahrt (1984). Bribery-tipping is also done before 
the service is rendered, as in tipping-in-advance. The difference between tipping-in-
advance and bribery-tipping is not always clear. Generally, I categorize tips in advance as 
bribery-tipping when someone else (either other consumers or the employer) is hurt as a 
result of what the worker does, and as tipping-in-advance otherwise.  
Tipping-in-advance is paying for something that is socially desirable: better service. 
Bribery-tipping is paying for something that is socially undesirable: getting preferred 
treatment without justification at the expense of others. For example, tipping a concierge 
in advance is not likely to hurt anyone and therefore is categorized as tipping-in-advance. 
Tipping a maitre d’ in order to get a table without having a reservation in an overbooked 
restaurant, however, implies that other customers with reservations (or those without 
reservations who arrived before the tipper) will have to wait longer for their tables, and 
can be considered a bribe offered to the maitre d’. Tipping the maitre d’ for a better table 
is somewhat more complex to categorize, but can still be categorized as bribery-tipping. 
If we assume that the customer is entitled to an average table, tipping the maitre d’ to get 
a better table hurts the other customers who get less-than-average tables.  
Another example for bribery-tipping in which the employer is hurt rather than other 
customers is when a guest tips the reservation manager to get a free upgrade of a hotel 
room. The owner of the hotel would prefer to sell the better room for a higher price rather 
than giving it as a free upgrade, and is hurt by the tipping transaction. As with other cases  
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of bribery, both the giver and the taker (the consumer and the worker) can be blamed. 
Despite the negative connotations of bribery, bribery-tipping can be welfare enhancing. 
For example, it allocates the good tables to those who value them the most, if we assume 
that everyone can tip to get the better tables. If some customers are less willing “to bribe” 
not because of the monetary cost but because they believe that this behavior is 
inappropriate, however, bribery-tipping can also reduce welfare.  
VII. Holiday-Tipping 
Tipping workers around Christmas is customary in many occupations, such as the 
newspaper boy, babysitter, doorman in an apartment building and housekeeper, among 
others (Star 1988). Since the tip is given once a year, it provides less incentives for good 
service than reward-tipping, yet it might provide such incentives if it is clear to the 
worker that the holiday tip reflects the level of service provided during the year. This 
form of tipping is somewhat between a tip and a gift.   
VIII. Gift-Tipping 
In some occupations, tips are considered inappropriate, yet customers often want to 
show their gratitude by something beyond saying “thank you.” One of the common ways 
to do so is to give a gift, for example flowers, a box of chocolates, or a fruit basket. For 
instance, such gifts are often given to nurses and doctors as a symbol of gratitude. This 
form of tipping provides little incentives for good service by itself. That is, nurses may 
provide excellent service because they are rewarded by the gratitude of the patient, and  
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the patient may want to show his gratitude by sending a box of chocolates, but it is not 
likely that the box of chocolates is itself the reason nurses provide excellent service.  
Gift-tipping may also take place in countries where monetary tips are not customary 
or even illegal, for example in China (Star 1988). Gift-tipping in these cases is again a 
method for the consumer to show his gratitude to the worker, although here the incentives 
provided by tipping may also be significant, and therefore promote better service.   
IX. Conclusion 
Tipping is a social norm that is economic in nature, and as such, lies in the 
intersection of economics and sociology. I argued that tipping is not a single 
phenomenon, but rather that tipping in various occasions can be very different from one 
another. I divided tipping customs to six categories: reward-tipping, price-tipping, 
tipping-in advance, bribery-tipping, holiday-tipping and gift-tipping, and discussed the 
economics of each of these categories. The discussion suggests that in many cases the 
social norm of tipping has economic justification, as it solves some inefficiency and 
increases welfare. In particular, it can promote good service where other mechanisms fail 
to do so. This suggests that the relationship between economics and social norms is 
indeed complex; not only social norms motivate economic behavior, but also economic 
reasons may promote the establishment of certain social norms.  
The economic justification for tipping also confirms the view expressed by Arrow 
(1971, p. 22), who wrote about social norms more generally, “I want, however, to 
conclude by calling attention to a less visible form of social action: norms of social  
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behavior, including ethical and moral codes. I suggest as one possible interpretation that 
they are reactions of society to compensate for market failures.” Two paragraphs below 
Arrow adds, “There is a whole set of customs and norms which might be similarly 
interpreted as agreements to improve the efficiency of the economic system (in the broad 
sense of satisfaction of individual values) by providing commodities to which the price 
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1 This is true in the common case where the tip is given after the service has already been provided. In 
principle, one could argue that tipping improves the service one receives in future encounters with the 
worker. But the observation that people tip also when they visit places they never intend to go back to (for 
example when traveling) undermines this argument.   
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2 Sales in the United States in 2001 of food and alcoholic beverages to consumers in full-service 
restaurants, bars and taverns, and lodging places, were $143.3, $12.5 and $20.1 billion, respectively (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2001, Table No. 1268; the numbers for 2001 are a projection). Summing the three numbers 
and multiplying by an average tip of 15 percent yield annual tips of $26.4 billion. The need for estimation 
arises because tips are often unreported to tax authorities: Hemenway (1993), for example, reports that the 
only income with a lower compliance rate in the United States is illegal income. 
3 It is an interesting question for future research to explore why people report large difference in tips 
according to service quality when asked hypothetically while in practice the effect of service quality on tips 
is small.  